MANILA, Aug. 16, 2016 — Allowing a hero’s burial for former President
Ferdinand Marcos will dishonor the efforts of those who fought the
dictatorship, including the mother of President Rodrigo Duterte, said
Catholic educators.
Contrary to Duterte’s claim that Marcos’ burial will bring “healing,”
the Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines (CEAP) said it
would mock many Filipinos’ sacrifices.
“Given the gravity of Mr. Marcos’ crimes against the people and
country, his burial at the Libingan will not heal or foster unity,” said
CEAP in an open letter to Duterte. Public outrage
“It will invalidate all that many heroes have spent their lives
fighting for—heroes such as your beloved mother, whom we honor and
remember as one of the strongest crusaders in the fight for democracy
and justice,” it added.
The CEAP was referring to Duterte’s mother, Soledad Duterte, who was a leading anti-Marcos figure in Davao.
Duterte’s plan to give the late dictator a hero’s burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani on Sept. 18 triggered public outrage.
On Sunday, several groups, including Church people, braved bad
weather and staged a rally at the Luneta Park to express their objection
to the planned hero’s burial for Marcos.
The CEAP, composed of 1,425 member-schools, colleges and
universities, reiterated that Marcos does not belong in the heroes’
cemetery.
Not a hero
“He was not a hero,” stressed the group.
“We look forward to your promise of change being fulfilled, of old
wrongs being redressed. We ask that you take the biggest step in
rectifying one of the country’s oldest wrongs.”
“President Rody, we ask nothing that you have not already promised. Justice. Unity. Healing,” added CEAP.
The group also urged the President to grant Marcos’ deathbed wish to be buried next to his mother in Ilocos Norte.
“At his deathbed, Mr. Marcos himself asked that he be buried next to
his mother in Ilocos, where he is revered and loved,” the CEAP said.
“Fulfilling Mr. Marcos’s deathbed wish will give us all the unity and closure that this country desperately needs,” it said. (CBCPNews) http://www.cbcpnews.com/cbcpnews/?p=82434
Public opposition continues to build up as the Duterte
administration prepares to bury the remains of ousted dictator Ferdinand
Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) on Sept. 18.
Various lawmakers, groups and even government agencies, such as the
National Historical Commission have spoken out against giving a hero’s
burial for Marcos, which they said equates to an exoneration of the
Marcos family’s crimes against the people, and brings them closer back
to power in Malacañang. This week, Inquirer.net reported that Malacañang
released a memo from Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, dated Aug. 7,
ordering the Armed Forces of the Philippines to draft the plans for the
transport and interment ceremony of Marcos’ remains in the LNMB. The
memo referred to a verbal order given by Duterte on July 11. During his
electoral campaign, Duterte had said he will allow the burial of Marcos
at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
In Congress, progressive lawmakers filed House resolution 197
opposing the move, calling it a “monumental historical distortion,” as
giving a hero’s burial for Marcos sends “the absurd message that the
Filipino people overthrew a ‘hero’ during People Power I and that the
international community’s sympathy for that uprising is wrong.”
“The Marcos dictatorship violently suppressed political dissent,
committed crimes against humanity, plundered the country’s resources,
and perpetuated US imperialism’s stranglehold on the nation,” said the
proposed House resolution, filed by seven Makabayan bloc lawmakers on
Aug. 11.
Marcos died in exile on Sept. 28, 1989 in Hawaii, where his family
was flown by the US government to escape the first People Power in 1986.
In September 1993, President Ramos allowed the repatriation of the
dictator’s remains, but refused to give him a hero’s burial.
Marcos’ remains has since been preserved and kept on display in a
refrigerated glass coffin in the Marcos Museum and Mausoleum in Batac
city, Ilocos Norte.
The proposed house resolution said the Marcos family signed an
agreement with the Ramos administration, which allowed the repatriation
of the ousted dictator, on the following conditions: it will be brought
home without fanfare; it will be buried in Ilocos Norte, and with
military honors only up to the rank of major.
The Makabayan proposed resolution cited the human rights violations
from 1976 to 1983, that “formed the apex of a pyramid of terror:” 3,257
killed, 35,000 tortured, 70,000 incarcerated, 737 Filipinos
“disappeared” from 1976 to 1983. During martial law, the word
“salvaging” came to mean summary execution, as mutilated bodies were
dumped in public areas. Up to 2,250 salvaged victims were documented,
“dumped on roadsides for public display to create widespread fear.”
The proposed resolution also cited how Marcos plunged the country
into a “cycle of ever-growing debt,” as foreign debt had ballooned, from
$1 billion in 1966 when Marcos took power, to $28 billion in 1986 at
the time he was ousted. Ibon Foundation said debts incurred under Marcos
alone will be shouldered by Filipino taxpayers up to 2025. On the other
hand, the late Solicitor General Frank Chavez estimated that Marcos had
up to $13.4 billion stashed in various Swiss banks.
“Marcos and his family have never acknowledged these grave violations
and have never apologized to the Filipino people up to the present,”
the resolution said.
During this year’s elections, martial law victims formed the Campaign
Against the Return of the Marcoses in Malacañang (Carmma) to thwart the
vice presidential bid of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. The younger
Marcos lost to administration bet Leni Robredo by a small margin of
votes, and has recently petitioned for a recount.
This weekend, various groups are staging protests against the Marcos
burial: at the National Council of Churches in the Philippines in Quezon
City on Aug. 13, and in Luneta, Manila on Aug. 14. ‘Marcos’ bronze coffin insults martial law victims’
The Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) scoffed at the reported bronze
casket being prepared for Marcos’ remains, in stark contrast to how
hundreds of martial law victims, the desaparecidos, were “abducted, murdered and buried in unmarked graves.”
“The wealth illegally amassed by the Marcoses will again be used to
‘honor’ the late dictator, in the same way it is used to whitewash his
sins. State honors and the Marcos family’s ostentatious display of
wealth are doubly insulting to the victims of the dictatorship,” said
the Bayan statement.
Solid bronze caskets cost up to $30,000, Bayan said.
The youth group Anakbayan called the impending burial a “travesty of
justice and distortion of history,” as they said the Marcos dictatorship
has yet to pay for the thousands of youth activists, “the cream of the
crop” who were killed for fighting martial law.
“It does not matter if the Libingan ng mga Bayani was originally a
cemetery for soldiers, one of Duterte’s justifications for burying
Marcos there as a soldier. Giving Marcos a hero’s burial sends a wrong
signal that crimes against humanity and plunder will be celebrated by
the state,” said Vencer Crisostomo, Anakbayan chairperson, in a
statement.
“We are reminding President Duterte not to use his office simply to
give favors to those who supported his electoral campaign. The Marcos
burial, in particular, should not be made just to repay political debts
to his close friend Bongbong Marcos,” Crisostomo said.
The Alliance of Concerned Teachers said a hero’s burial for Marcos
equals “rewriting history” and insults martial law victims and their
families.
“It took a people’s movement to topple the late fascist-dictator
Ferdinand Marcos. To honor his memory by burying him in the Libingan ng
mga Bayani sends a distorted message to our children that dictators and
plunderers can be called heroes and accorded honors,” said ACT national
chairperson Benjie Valbuena.
Revising history | Marcos burial at Libingan ng mga Bayani
When pressed about why he is allowing the burial of the late dictator
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani despite the numerous
protests, President Duterte justified his decision by saying: “He was a
president and a soldier. Simple.”
Well and good if the matter is as simple as that. If Marcos were any
other president or any other soldier, there could be no argument about
allowing his or her burial at Libingan ng Bayani. After all, that
cemetery has been reserved for them, and any soldier or veteran, whether
a private or a general, has the privilege of being buried there, if the
soldier or his or her family so wishes. I suppose the same is true for
dead presidents.
But the case of the late president Marcos is far more complicated
than what President Duterte makes it appear to be. By declaring martial
law and usurping all power to himself, the late dictator Marcos plunged
the nation in one of the, if not the darkest period in the country’s
history.
Thousands of people, in the prime of their lives, were victimized:
killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured, imprisoned, and forcibly
displaced. Gross violations of human rights under the Marcos
dictatorship are not myths or urban legends; these have been proven
multiple times by the testimonies of the living victims and the
relatives of the dead and the disappeared. Even the Federal District
Court of Hawaii found, beyond reasonable doubt, that indeed the late
dictator Marcos and his minions violated the rights of thousands of
Filipinos. The Federal court awarded $1.9 billion in damages to the
victims and their relatives.
Burying Marcos with full honors not only would rub salt to the wounds
of the victims and their relatives, it would disregard the fact that
thousands were victimized and worse, it practically would justify these
violations.
Added to this, the callous act of burying Marcos at the Libingan ng
mga Bayani would deny the fact that the Marcos dictatorship plunged the
country into deep political, economic, and social crisis. The country
experienced an oil crisis, rice crisis, sugar crisis, dollar crisis,
among others.
The late dictator’s son boasts of the infrastructure projects under
Marcos, without revealing that these buried the country into debt, which
the nation has been paying up to now. He boasts of the Marcos family’s
version of unity, while ignoring the fact that the late dictator used
the full machinery of the state to create an atmosphere of fear in the
hope of eradicating all forms of opposition to its rule. The Marcos
family boasts of eliminating the stranglehold of oligarchs on the
economy, but centralized all wealth and established a monopoly of
strategic, profitable businesses in the country.
The historical significance and political implications of the burial
of the dictator Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani are not lost on the
Marcos family. This is why they have been spending to preserve his
remains for almost three decades already. They have the money to
construct a mansion to bury his remains. They could even buy a whole
memorial park to bury him there.
But they chose to wait. And burying the remains of the late dictator
Marcos with full military honors would just as well be the launching
pad for the return of the Marcos family to Malacañang through the son
Bongbong.
While justifying his decision to allow the burial of Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani with what appears to be simple logic and
legalities, the historical significance and political implications of
this decision are likewise not lost on the Duterte administration. For
one, President Duterte has, several times, publicly acknowledged his
friendship with the Marcos family. He boasted that his father served
under Marcos. During his campaign, Duterte declared that if he wins and
then fails to complete his term, he would be more than willing to leave
the reins of government to Bongbong. President Duterte has also
declared that he would appoint Bongbong to a Cabinet position once the
prohibition on losing candidates expires.
Just last Tuesday, in a tirade against Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
Sereno, President Duterte asked her if she would rather that he declares
martial law, because of his perception that Chief Justice Sereno was
blocking his anti-drug campaign by issuing a letter advising judges
named by the president in his list of government officials allegedly
involved in the illegal drugs trade not to surrender without a warrant.
Was the mention of declaring martial law a mere rhetorical question?
Last week, August 3, in a speech, President Duterte declared that his
administration intends to destroy oligarchs then singled out
businessman Roberto Ongpin. Is he emulating the purported campaign
against oligarchs by the late dictator Marcos?
What about Duterte’s controversial anti-drugs campaign that has
claimed the lives of hundreds of poor Filipinos, totally disregarding
the principles of due process and human rights? Does this not reflect
the mindset and ways of the late dictator Marcos?
Let us just hope that this is just a case of overreaction, and that
the similarities between what Marcos did and what Duterte has been doing
and appears to be intending to do stops here. But still, the
historical significance and political implications of the burial of
Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, with full honors, should not be
lost on the Filipino people. After all, it is the people who shape
history.
Martial law survivors urge high court to stop hero’s burial for Marcos
Florentino, her husband Ernesto and their only daughter Gemma, then
only eight years old, were dragged by soldiers from their home in
Tatalon, Quezon City on June 18, 1977. Florentino and Gemma were brought
to Camp Crame where they stayed in different detention cells for a
month. Ernesto was jailed at Camp Bagong Diwa and was released after
three months.
Their incarceration, however brief, left a scar on their lives.
After being released from detention, the family had to report weekly
to the military. This only stopped when Marcos was toppled through a
popular uprising in February 1986.
Tears formed in Florentino’s eyes when asked of her message to President Rodrigo Duterte.
“It’s so painful. It’s like erasing the sins of Marcos,” Florentino told Bulatlat in an interview.
Florentino who was among the thousands who filed the historic classic
suit against the Marcoses said burying Marcos would distort historical
facts, particularly the atrocities during the Marcos dictatorship.
“What about the thousands who were tortured, who were raped?”
Florentino said, adding that there were enormous pieces of evidence
proving human rights abuses during martial law.
“We’re still alive,” Florentino said. “We have not forgotten.” Implications
Neri Colmenares, president of the National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers
(NUPL) and was also detained during martial law, said the executive’s
plan would have legal implications on the cases filed against the
Marcoses.
Colmenares said the Marcoses would brag that the late dictator is a hero and would use it to their advantage. Legal grounds
In their petition for certiorari and prohibition, martial law
survivors maintained that the existing laws prohibit the burial of
Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
Citing the Armed Forces of the Philippines regulations on allocation
of cemetery plots at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, petitioners said Marcos
is not qualified.
The petitioners said that the the Libingan ng mga Bayani was created
by virtue of Republic Act 289 and Sec. 1 provides that the purpose of
the construction of a national pantheon is “to perpetuate the memory of
all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots for
the inspiration and emulation of this generation and of generations
still unborn.”
“The burial of Ferdinand Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani simply
mocks and taunts Section 1 of RA 289,” the petitioners said.
The petitioners noted that apart from the human rights violations
during the Marcos dictatorship, the fact remains undisputed that Marcos
and his family, during his term, acquired billions worth of ill-gotten
wealth.
“The crimes of Marcos against the Filipino people and even against humanity involved moral turpitude,” the petitioners said.
The petitioners maintained that the memorandum dated 07 August 2016
issued by Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana with the subject
“Interment of the late Former President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. at LNMB”
and the directive on the interment of Marcos issued by Rear Admiral
Ernesto C. Enriquez by command of General Ricardo R. Visaya are
“patently illegal and were made with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
Other petitioners include National Artist for Literature Bienvenido
Lumbera, Makabayan president Satur Ocampo, Bayan chairperson Carol
Araullo, film director Bonifacio Ilagan and members of Samahan ng
Ex-Detainees Laban sa Aresto (SELDA).
I. Introduction
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
assumed power on December 30, 1965, and became the second president
reelected to office in 1969. There were efforts to maneuver the 1971
Constitutional Convention to permit his continuing in office.[1]
With the swell of student radicalization and increasing number of
violent demonstrations, Marcos played up middle-class fears and used
these to justify the imposition of Martial Law on September 23, 1972 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081.
Martial Law was not just an invocation of the President’s emergency powers under the 1935 Constitution—Marcos
went further to assume all governing powers, excluded civilian courts,
and systematically replaced the 1935 Constitution with the 1973 Constitution for his own ends. The replacement of the Constitution was done under dubious circumstances.
First, Marcos ordered a viva voce plebiscite on January 10–15, 1973 in which the voting age was reduced to 15 to ratify the new Constitution.[2]
Military men were placed prominently to intimidate voters. Reports
indicated that mayors and governors were given quotas for “yes” votes on
the constitution and negative votes were often not recorded.[3]
Results report that 90 percent of the citizens have voted for the
constitution even though some communities did not participate in the
“citizens assemblies.”[4]
Over the next few years, Marcos would hold four more plebiscites—in
1973, 1975, 1976, and 1978—through citizen assemblies to legitimize
the continuation of martial rule.[5]
Second, he intimidated the Supreme Court to approve it. Using the
stick and carrot method on the justices of the Supreme Court, President
Marcos was able to force the Supreme Court to uphold martial law and the
new constitution. Previously, around 8,000 individuals, including
senators, civil libertarians, journalists, students, and labor leaders,
were arrested and detained without due process upon the declaration of
martial law.[6]
With many of them filing petitions to the Supreme Court for habeas
corpus, they challenged the constitutionality of the proclamation.
However, the Supreme Court issued its final decision, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,
which essentially validated the constitution. This would be the final
legitimizing decision on the constitutionality of Martial Law: in G.R.
No. L-35546 September 17, 1974, the Supreme Court dismissed petitions
for habeas corpus by ruling that martial law was a political question
beyond the jurisdiction of the court; and that, furthermore, the court
had already deemed the 1973 Constitution in full force and effect,
replacing the 1935 Constitution.
After the landmark decision, Chief Justice Roberto V. Concepcion went
into early retirement, 50 days before his originally scheduled
retirement date, in silent protest over the majority in the Javellana v. Executive Secretary case.
He argued against the validity of the new constitution and its
questionable aspects, together with Justices Claudio Teehankee, Calixto
Zaldivar, and Enrique Fernando.
Martial law imposed government control over all forms of media. On September 22, 1972, Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 1, ordering the Press Secretary and Defense Secretary to assume control over all media outlets. All periodicals were padlocked,[7]
and media personalities who had criticized Marcos, his family, or his
administration were taken to Camp Crame without any charges being filed.
Among them were publishers Joaquin “Chino” P. Roces (Manila Times) and Eugenio Lopez Jr. (Manila Chronicle), and columnists Max Soliven and Luis D. Beltran.[8]
Marcos issued at least eleven Presidential Decrees that suppressed
press freedom. Journalists who did not comply with the new restrictions
faced physical threats, libel suits, or forced resignation.[9]
With such stringent censorship regulations, most of the periodicals
that were allowed to operate were crony newspapers, such as Benjamin
Romualdez’s Times Journal, Hans Menzi’s Bulletin Today, and Roberto Benedicto’s Philippine Daily Express. These newspapers offered “bootlicking reportage” on the country’s economy while completely eschewing political issues.[10]
Hence, President Marcos’ absolute rule had a “cloak of legality”[11]
and incontestability, making it nearly impregnable. However, specific
factors converged and eventually led to the fall of the dictatorship and
the eventual restoration of democracy in the Philippines. II. Factors that led to the Fall of the Dictatorship A. Opposition to Martial Law in the 1970s
Popular anti-Marcos sentiment existed for the duration of Martial
Law. According to David Wurfel, there were three paramount types of
opposition to martial law during the 1970s: reformist opposition,
revolutionary opposition, and religious opposition.[12] Reformist Opposition
The reformist opposition, also known as the legal opposition, was
composed of members of the upper-middle class. Using nonviolent tactics,
they advocated political (not necessarily socioeconomic) reforms.
However, the reformist opposition was not a united movement, but an
amalgamation of different middle- and upper-class groups who had
different motives. It was for this reason that Marcos tolerated them, so
long as they were incapable of viably replacing him or attaining the
support of the masses.[13] David Wurfel writes:
Disunity within the reformist opposition also reflected
the diversity of interests and the lack of ideology within the middle
class. The reformers shared certain values, such as support for the rule
of law, constitutional legitimacy, free elections, and the protection
of personal freedoms, and they agreed on the need to replace Marcos. But
they agreed on little else. On nationalism, land reform, and the
autonomy of labor organizations there was everything from explicit
demands to complete silence. Once discussion went beyond the basic
characteristics of the political process, the question of what to reform
was a divisive one.[14]
1978 was a watershed year for the reformist opposition because it was
the first election year in the country since 1969. The reformist
opposition was divided on the issue of boycotting the Interim Batasang
Pambansa (IBP) elections set for April 7.
Senator Gerardo “Gerry” Roxas refused to reactivate the Liberal Party
for the elections because Marcos failed to address their concerns
regarding electoral reform; to participate in such an unfair election
would have given it credibility, and the Martial Law regime undue
legitimacy.[15]
Jose W. Diokno, a former Nacionalista and long-time critic of Marcos
and Martial Law, was also adamantly opposed to the IBP elections.[16]
The most prominent opposition movement that participated in the IBP
elections was the newly formed Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) party of former
senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., who was imprisoned at that time.[17]
Ninoy was initially apprehensive about running in the election, but he
decided to push through with his candidacy to give the populace a chance
to air out their frustration against the government. He campaigned from
his jail cell, even appearing for a 90-minute television interview.[18]
Ninoy’s candidacy inspired an outpouring of popular support that
culminated in a noise barrage on the evening before the elections. At
8:00 p.m., residents in Metro Manila took to the streets, making
whatever noise they could “to let Ninoy Aquino in his prison cell know
that the people had heard his message.”[19] They banged on pots and pans, honked their car horns, and shouted their throats sore in support of Ninoy and LABAN.[20]
However, the elections were a total shutout for LABAN, with Marcos’
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) winning 91 percent of the seats in the
IBP.[21]
Ninoy
Aquino’s manifesto for the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) campaign for the
elections. Photo from Ninoy: The Willing Martyr by Alfonso P. Policarpio
Jr.
In 1981, Marcos officially lifted Martial Law, but since all decrees
issued during that time were still in force, the lifting was merely a
symbolic gesture. In the June presidential elections of that year, he
ran under the KBL, his main opponent being Nacionalist Alejo Santos.
Unlike in the 1978 IBP elections, the reformist opposition was united in
its stance to boycott the polls,labeling it a sham after Marcos refused
the conditions they had previously proposed, such as a minimum campaign
period, a purging of voters’ lists, equal time and space for the
opposition, and a reorganization of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).[22] Revolutionary Opposition
The government’s use of communist and secessionist threats as
justification for Martial Law only contributed to the growth of the
political opposition and the amassing of recruits to the New People’s
Army (NPA)[23] and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the provinces in the 1970s.[24]
When Martial Law was declared, the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) was immediately mobilized. Formed by students and politicians
from Mindanao, its goal was to create the Bangsa Moro Republik (Moro
National Republic), composed of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. The Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) attempted to seize their “illegal”
firearms supplied by Libya, sparking a war that lasted from 1973 to
1977.[25]
Over the course of the war, 13,000 people were killed while over a
million were displaced. At the height of the conflict, the government
spent an estimated $1 million a day to contain the rebellion. However,
internal problems within the MNLF prevented them from exploiting Marcos’
weakness. Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso write:
Its military leaders lacked combat experience and
suffered major battlefield losses, while its political leaders split
along ethnic lines (Tausug versus Maguindanao) over tactical issues. As
the MNLF lost on the military front, its politician allies also began to
defect, making separate peace pacts with Marcos and presenting
themselves as a “moderate alternative” to the revolutionary Moro
nationalists. Government overtures and the cooperation of conservative
Arab states eventually led to negotiations and a de facto cease-fire in
1977. The MNLF was no match for Marcos diplomatically and the decline of
Arab support made the continuation of conventional warfare impossible. .
. . By the time Marcos fell, the MNLF had lost its dynamism as well.[26]
In contrast, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
strengthened as Marcos’ dictatorship weakened; as opposed to the Partido
Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), which surrendered in 1974. Following the
principle of “centralized command, decentralized operations,” the CPP
established autonomous, regional, self-sustaining chapters all over the
Philippines. Not only did this give CPP cadres more freedom to
experiment with tactics appropriate to their localities, it also helped
them survive the loss of many original leaders, either to prison or
death.[27]
In November, 1977, the Armed Forces scored an important victory over
the communist rebels with the capture of Jose Maria Sison and other
important party leaders leading to the disarray of the Communist Party.
But the triumph was short-lived and was too late as the influence of the
CPP grew stronger within the provinces.[28]
Party growth was fastest in areas where human rights violations were
high due to military presence. By the late 1970s, the CPP could claim a
guerrilla force of 15,000, around the same number of cadres, and a “mass
base” of around one million. While AFP forces also experienced rapid
growth during this period and were better equipped, there was a
difference between the two. Gregg Jones writes that “[d]espite a high
rate of illiteracy, communist soldiers could explain why they were
fighting and what they were fighting for. In contrast, most government
soldiers were poor peasants or slum dwellers who enlisted in the
government army not out of political conviction but because of economic
deprivation.”[29]
Through the Kilusang Mayo Uno (the May First Labor Movement) and the
League of Filipino Students, the CPP was able to gather labor unions and
solidify its control of important schools. The CPP also made
“anti-imperialist” alliances with nationalist senators like Lorenzo
Tañada and Jose Diokno, who could lend credibility and publicity to
claims of the Marcos government’s human rights violations.[30] Religious Opposition
Martial Law also faced opposition from the religious sector. Mainline
Protestant churches have been vocal in their opposition of the
dictatorship since 1972; by 1978, they were holding mass protest
actions, and by 1981, they held boycott campaigns for the April
plebiscite and the June presidential elections.[31]
Meanwhile the Catholic Church, which sympathized with Marcos’
anti-communism, maintained a position of “critical collaboration” while
paying attention to the opposition among its members.[32]
This allowed it a degree of autonomy when it came to carrying out their
social projects, which focused on alleviating poverty and defending the
poor against communism. However, the provincial clergy started becoming
radicalized after seeing the effects of the Marcos dictatorship on the
poor. They formed Christians for National Liberation, which
clandestinely used Church “social action” programs to get foreign
funding through private donor agencies that shared the same views.[33] Abinales and Amoroso write:
Church leaders were appalled by this radical
infiltration, but could do little about it. To attack its own rank and
file for following the official Church position on human rights and
social justice would open the hierarchy to charges of supporting the
dictatorship. A serious breach opened up within the Philippine Church.[34]
When Jaime Cardinal Sin replaced the conservative Rufino Cardinal
Santos as Archbishop of Manila, one of his first acts was to issue a
letter condemning the summary arrest of Jesuit Frs. Jose Blanco and
Benigno Mayo. They were arrested during a raid on the Sacred Heart
Novitiate in Novaliches, in 1974. Sin presided over a prayer vigil for
the detained priests, “which more than 5,000 persons attended, the
largest anti-martial law protest at the time.” In 1975, Sin declared his
opposition to a Marcos decree “banning all labor strikes.” US President
Gerald Ford was visiting Manila, so Marcos beat a hasty retreat and
confined the prohibition to strategic industries. The harassment
continued. Church-owned media, which had escaped closure in 1972, was
shut down in 1976–1977, among them the weekly newspaper and radio
station of Bishop Francisco Claver’s diocese in Bukidnon, Davao’s radio
station, and Church magazines in Manila. The government threatened to
tax Church properties and subject them to urban land reform. Sin’s
policy of “critical collaboration” during this time began to give away
to active resistance, as the religious indignation spread over the
continuing arrests and more of the clergy became radicalized. Sin may
have thought to steal the thunder from the radical priests by hurling
the bolts himself. Protestant groups began to rally against Marcos in
1978. By 1979, Sin was firmly on the path to his preeminent role in the
overthrow of Marcos.[35]
About 5,000 demonstrators, organized by students,
attempted to march to Malacañan Palace on October 10, 1976 to protest at
four years of Martial Law imposed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Its
main purpose was to protest at the referendum-plebiscite scheduled to
take place on October 16. Video from Associated Press.
[WATCH: Lifting of Martial Law, January 17, 1981] On January 17, 1981, on Constitution Day (8 years after the 1973
Constitution was promulgated), President Ferdinand E. Marcos decreed
Martial Law officially lifted. In this video excerpt, President Marcos
reads from Proclamation No. 2045. Video from PTV4.
In the events leading to the important state visit, the Coconut
Palace was commissioned by First Lady Imelda Marcos to be built at the
cost of ₱37 million as the guesthouse of the Pope. However, the Pontiff
refused, saying it was too ostentatious, given the state of the poor in
the country.[36]
Moreover, during his visit in Malacañan Palace, the Pope delivered a
speech explicitly condemning the human rights violations committed under
the regime. He said:
“Even in exceptional situations that may at times arise, one can
never justify any violation of the fundamental dignity of the human
person or of the basic rights that safeguard this dignity.”[37]
Since then, the Catholic Church had withdrawn its support of the Marcos administration. B. Marcos’ Health and the Issue of Succession
As early as 1979, the health of President Marcos had been deteriorating.[38]
This was kept a secret at first, but it was common knowledge then that
Marcos was already sick, especially at the time of the assassination of
Ninoy Aquino.[39]
Marcos’ health status worsened by mid-November of 1984. Blas Ople,
Marcos’ Minister of Labor, divulged the situation for the first time on
record on December 3, 1984, saying that Marcos was “in control but
cannot take major initiatives at this time.” He stated that, “The health
of our leader is undergoing certain vicissitudes, problems which
started a year ago.”[40] On October 28, 1985, according to congressional and US intelligence sources quoted by the Washington Post, Marcos was diagnosed with an “incurable, recurring sickness” called systemic lupus erythematosus.[41] This disease was further complicated by Marcos’ diabetes.[42]
Marcos’ failing health, coupled with the looming threat from the
anti-capitalist left, led to widespread concern for a stable succession
among the country’s economic elite—the main beneficiaries of Martial
Law’s crony capitalism.[43]
The plebiscite held on April 7, 1981, ratified the constitutional
amendment creating the Executive Committee, composed of at most 14
members, at least half of which were Assemblymen.[44]
The Committee was meant to be “a stepping stone for future leadership
in the country . . . a high-level training ground for future Prime
Ministers and Presidents.”[45]
It was deemed necessary at that time because no one member of the
administration’s Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) was deemed capable of
taking over for President Marcos in the event of his death, resignation,
or incapacitation; it was implied that the Committee member who
performed the best would be Marcos’ successor.[46]
Contenders for the presidency started positioning themselves to gain
the upper hand. For instance, there were attempts to discredit Prime
Minister Cesar Virata and the programs associated with economic
technocrats, while Imelda Marcos’ strove to repair her tarnished image
(especially in the provinces) while pushing her son Ferdinand “Bongbong”
Marcos Jr. further into the public eye.[47]
However, Marcos’ deteriorating health necessitated clearer guidelines
for determining a successor. Another plebiscite on January 27, 1984,
ratified the constitutional amendment abolishing the Executive Committee
and restoring the Office of the Vice President,[48] to be filled in the upcoming 1987 elections[49]—which
never came because Marcos announced snap elections in 1985. The same
plebiscite also designated the speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as
acting president should the presidency be vacated before the 1987
presidential elections.[50]
Ousted
President Marcos and Imelda Marcos in exile at the backyard of their
villa overlooking Honolulu, Hawaii on March 1988. Diagnosed with
systemic lupus erythematosus, he had several surgeries for kidney
dialysis a year after this photo was taken. Marcos died on September 28
of the same year, due to heart, kidney and lung failure. Photo by
Gamblin Yann.C. The Collapse of the Philippine Economy
Economist James Boyce commented, “If the central aim of economic
development is the reduction of poverty, then the Philippine development
strategy in the Marcos era was an abysmal failure.”[51]
In the last years of the Marcos regime, the Philippine economy was
almost grinding to a halt. This was so, despite the fact that the Marcos
administration implemented its three-pronged development strategy: (1)
The green revolution[52] in agriculture[53],
(2) growth and diversity in agricultural and forestry exports, and (3)
massive external borrowing. The profit from these three strategies were
amassed disproportionately to the wealthiest in the population, thereby
causing a large disparity between the rich and the poor.
In the case of agriculture, the higher rice yields saved land for
export crops and saved foreign exchange for non-rice imports, but these
gains never trickled down to the poor. In addition, there were
government intervention, cronyism and monopolization of agricultural
markets such as that of sugar and coconut.[54] In these cases, key government agencies were managed by Marcos associates and cronies, whose operations were not audited.[55]
Sugar was the country’s second most important export in the Marcos
regime. Specifically, in the mid-1970s, sugarcane plantations doubled to
more than 500,000 hectares. This increase, however, did not translate
to an increase in harvest and profit, which led ultimately to a
stagnation and eventual decline in the mid-1970s.[56]
As early as 1974, a government sugar monopsony was established to
participate in world trade and reap the benefits of increasing world
prices in sugar. When the sugar market declined in 1975 – 1976, the
trading responsibilities were transferred to PHILSUCOM[57] (Philippine Sugar Commission), headed by Roberto Benedicto, and to NASUTRA[58] (National Sugar Trading Corporation), headed by an associate of Marcos.
Under Benedicto’s chairmanship, the PHILSUCOM was empowered to buy,
sell, and set prices for sugar; and to buy and take over milling
companies. He also set up the Republic Planter’s Bank, which became the
sugar industry’s main source of finance during that time.[59]
For this, Benedicto was accused of “using his position to great
advantage over the past several years to forge an economic fiefdom, to
amass great wealth and to develop considerable political influence in
sugar growing areas”. The US Embassy reported that Benedicto had several
profit mechanisms:
bribery; acceptance of payoffs or bribes from traders lobbying for
guaranteed profit margins of sugar prices in the domestic market.
smuggling of sugar supplies; at least 600,000 metric tons of raw sugar was reportedly missing from the NASUTRA warehouses
withholding of taxes, PNP loan payments, as well as export trading costs;
These operations “amount to a significant and growing drain on the economy of the country.”[60]
Moreover, the sugar-marketing monopoly effectively protected the
interests of the sugar hacienderos close to Marcos, while small
landowners bore the brunt of the crisis, causing widespread starvation
among sugar plantation workers (specifically in Negros), reaching the
international media.[61]
Furthermore, other large-scale sugar owners grew resentful of President
Marcos because of the sugar-marketing monopoly that did his bidding and
the subsequent land-grabbing.[62]
At the end of the Marcos regime, the Philippine sugar industry nearly
collapsed. The majority of the planters were in debt and sugarcane
plantation dwindled.[63]
In the case of coconuts, beginning in 1973, the Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA) monopolized export and increased coconut tax in order to
stabilize market prices.[64]
Coconut marketing during the Marcos era was monopolized by a “single
entity with effective control over virtually all copra purchases and
over the production and sale of coconut oil on the domestic and export
markets.”[65]
This monopoly was technically made possible by Marcos’ presidential
decrees, providing for levies on all coconut production and an
establishment of a bank. While these changes were imposed to benefit the
the coconut growers, in practice, the main beneficiaries were Eduardo
Cojuangco, the so called “Coconut King,” and Juan Ponce Enrile, two of
President Marcos’ closest associates.[66]
In in the case of foreign loans, the primary pretext was for
Philippine domestic investment and building public infrastructure.
However, these loans were diverted to a few private companies, all of
which were under Marcos cronies, eroding the quality and quantity of
domestic investments; the rest were diverted to banks abroad. An example
of striking evidence of this was the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, which
was built at the cost of $1.2 billion but never generated a kilowatt of
electricity under the Marcos regime. “The losers were the Philippine
people,” writes Raymond Bonner, “the poor, on whose behalf the billion
dollars could have been better spent, as well as the middle class and
the wealthy, who would have to shoulder this economically backbreaking
colossus.”[67]
In 1973, Marcos decided that the Philippines had to have a nuclear
power plant—then considered the hallmark of a modern nation—because it
fit in with Marcos’ ostentatious vision of himself and the country.
However, such an endeavor at that time was problematic: at best, the
power plant would have generated power for only 15 percent of Luzon’s
population. Security was another issue: there were four active volcanoes
located within 100 miles from the proposed site. Furthermore, the
Philippines was one of the poorest nations setting out on the nuclear
path; only Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea were building nuclear power
plants in East Asia, and they were far better off economically and
technologically.[68]
The power plant was the largest and most expensive construction
project in the country’s history. Given the monumental expense, funding
the project out of the government’s treasury was impossible, so the
government turned to Export-Import Bank in Washington, DC, for
assistance. In 1975, $277 million in direct loans and $367 million in
loan guarantees was approved by Ex-Im Bank chairman William J. Casey,
one of Marcos’s biggest supporters. It was the largest loan package the
bank had approved anywhere.[69]
Westinghouse Electric initially submitted a vague, undetailed $500
million bid for two plants. General Electric, on the other hand,
submitted four full volumes detailing cost and specifications, conducted
nuclear power seminars in Manila, and invited Philippine officials to
visit its plant in California. Marcos, brooking no opposition, gave the
contract to Westinghouse. After Westinghouse secured the contract, it
submitted a serious proposal amounting to $1.2 billion for just one
reactor—almost 400 percent higher than the original bid of $500 million.
Marcos was guaranteed a cut of nearly $80 million, which Westinghouse
transmitted through Marcos crony Herminio Disini using a “maze of
channels, cutouts, and stratagems.”[70] Raymond Bonner elaborates:
Disini owned a construction company, which he had
purchased with a government-backed loan and which had been awarded,
without bits, a cost plus fixed fee contract for all civil construction
at the nuclear power plant site. The price of the equipment for the
project “was inflated, as a way to cover the cost of the fees to
Disini,” a lawyer who worked on the project explained to Fox Butterfield
of The New York Times. Westinghouse set up a subsidiary in
Switzerland, which funneled the money into Disini’s European bank
accounts. The Swiss subsidiary, after entering into the deal with the
Philippine government, assigned the contract to the Westinghouse
International Projects Company, which had been established solely to
handle the Philippine project. Westinghouse International, in turn,
entered into a subcontract with the Westinghouse Electric Corporation,
the parent company in Pittsburgh. Westinghouse officials repeatedly
denied any wrongdoing with the project.[71]
By 1986—more than a decade and $1.2 billion later—the power plant was still not operational.[72]
Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. Photo courtesy of Vinnell Belvoir Corporation.
The old economic elite, whom President Marcos called the “oligarchy,”
relatively tolerated the systematic favoritism of the administration on
crony companies. This changed In 1981, when Filipino Chinese business
tycoon Dewey Dee of the Binondo Central Bank left the country for
Canada, leaving nearly P600 million in debt, seriously compromising the
crony corporations. Government banks announced a rescue fund of
approximately P5 billion in credit and equity capital, which the old
elite found unfair, launching a barrage of public criticism.[73]
The impoverishment of the economy led to the loss of support of the
middle class and the small-time landowners and farmers in the regions on
the Marcos administration. Poverty, aside from human rights violations
by the military, also became a means for rebel groups to recruit
citizens to their cause. In 1978, the strength of the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) grew from 6,900 to over 20,000 regulars.[74]
In 1980, the New People’s Army formed 26 guerrilla fronts with over
16,000 regulars, and the Communist Party of the Philippines have
attracted 40,000 mass activists.[75] D. The Assassination of Ninoy Aquino
After three years of exile in the United States, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., the foremost leader of the Marcos opposition, decided to come back to the Philippines, intending to restore democracy in the country
and convince President Marcos for an orderly succession. Previously,
Aquino had been incarcerated by the military for seven years before
being released for bypass surgery in the United States. Ninoy Aquino’s
conversation with journalist Teodoro Locsin Jr. before he went back to
the Philippines was revealing.[76] He was quoted as saying:
“I’ll go to Marcos, if he’ll see me. I’ll appeal to his
sense of history, of his place in it. He would not be publishing all
those books of his if he did not care for the judgment of history, if he
did not want to look good in it. And that would be possible, I’ll tell
him, only if there was an orderly restoration of democracy and freedom
for our people. Otherwise, there would be only revolution and terrible
suffering. I give the moderate opposition five years to restore
democracy, after that there will be only the Communists as an
alternative to Marcos or his successor. I’ll offer my services to him,
but my price is freedom for our people.”[77]
He departed from Boston on August 13, 1983. Despite news of a death
threat, Ninoy maintained in an interview on August 21, 1983 that “if it’s [my] fate to die by an assassin’s bullet, then so be it. […] [I have] to suffer with our people and [I have] to lead them.”
Ninoy Aquino’s assassination. Photo taken from Ninoy: Ideals & Ideologies 1932-1983.
Aquino landed in the Manila International Airport via China Airlines
Flight 811 at 1:05 p.m. on August 21, and was escorted by armed men out
of the plane. Minutes later, gunshots were heard. The former senator was
shot dead by an assassin’s bullet to the head. When the news of Ninoy’s
death spread, approximately seven million came to his funeral
procession on August 31, the biggest and longest in Philippine history.
This singular event further eroded the people’s support of the Marcos
regime. E. The Failure of the Snap Election of 1986
In the first week of November 1985, when President Marcos was interviewed in the David Brinkley Show,
he stated his intention to call for a snap election, even going so far
as to invite the members of the US Congress to observe, calling the
accusation of fraud as unfounded.[78]
This, it seems, was an attempt to consolidate support and show the
United States the legitimacy of the Marcos administration. The
announcement for a snap election within three months was ahead of
schedule; the next regular elections were supposed to be held in 1987.
The President was overconfident; he disregarded the objections of his
family, his Cabinet, and his party.[79] Even First Lady Imelda Marcos, who was abroad at the time, was also reportedly taken aback by the announcement.[80]
However, as recent scholarship suggests, this confidence only showed
his isolation from the people whose support on his administration had
already waned. Marcos’ Labor Minister, Blas Ople writes:
He (Marcos) couldn’t say that he was beleaguered and
encircled, that he was losing the support of Washington and the
international community and that he needed a breakthrough to reestablish
his ability to govern. He was never that frank with us but we knew why.[81]
Marcos had to consolidate his forces if the election would go to his
favor. As it was before the declaration of Martial Law, Marcos needed
the support of the military. While acting Chief of Staff General Fidel
V. Ramos was next in line as the Chief of Staff, the president knew that
he needed Fabian Ver back. Ver was on leave, as he was being prosecuted
in the Aquino-Galman murder case. By December 2, 1985, Ver and 26 other
suspects were acquitted in a legal decision that caused public outrage.[82]
Meanwhile, prior to the snap election announcement, a “Convenor
Group” was formed, composed of Lorenzo Tañada, Jaime V. Ongpin, and Cory
Aquino, to select a presidential candidate for the opposition. Cory was
regarded as the rightful candidate, the “people’s choice,” who was also
promoted by Jaime Cardinal Sin.[83]
For fear of being left out, Salvador Laurel of the United Nationalist
Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and Eva Kalaw of the Liberal Party (LP)
formed the National Unification Committee’s (NUC).[84]
Laurel was nominated by the NUC’s Nominating Convention held at the
Araneta Coliseum as the presidential candidate of the opposition party
for the coming Snap elections.[85]
Meanwhile, Cory Aquino announced her intention to run if a snap
election was to be held, and if she had the support of a million
citizens.[86]
She was successful in gaining this support. The opposition, therefore
had two frontrunners: Aquino, and former Senator Salvador “Doy” Laurel.
However, in the same year, on December 7,
Laurel decided to give way to Aquino. Though initially reluctant,
Laurel was eventually convinced that their tandem was the only way the
opposition stood a chance against the overwhelming influence of Marcos
and the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), and decided to run as Aquino’s
vice president. In Teodoro L. Locsin Jr.’s article in the Philippine Free Press, Cory served as the “symbol of unity.” He further wrote:
“Cory would be the presidential candidate, and Doy who had spent substance and energy to create ex nihilo a political organization to challenge the Marcos machine must subordinate himself as her running mate.”
Aquino and Laurel ran together under the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO).[87]
President Ferdinand E. Marcos attends a rally prior to the Snap Elections. Photo by Peter Charlesworth.Cory Aquino with her son, Benigno S. Aquino III. on the campaign trail, 1986. Photo from Teddy Locsin Jr.
During the 1986 snap elections, President Ferdinand
E. Marcos used gender as an issue in his campaign broadcast against
rival for the presidency, Corazon C. Aquino. This broadcast warns that a
woman would not be able to handle the challenges of the post.
Businessman Jose Concepcion headed a group of concerned citizens to
revive the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), established
in 1957 after the fraud of the 1949 Presidential election, as the
citizens’ watchdog on the counting of votes. It had a successful run in
the legislative elections of 1984, releasing an unofficial untampered
count. KBL attempted to discredit NAMFREL, but due to international
pressure, COMELEC gave the watchdog organization official observer
status.[88]
Massive poll fraud and rampant cheating marred the vote on the day of
the elections, February 7, 1986. Thousands of registered voters—who had
voted successfully in previous elections—found their names suspiciously
missing from the lists.[89] Approximately 850 foreign correspondents flew in to observe,[90] including a delegations headed by U.S. senators and congressmen, who saw vote rigging happen.[91]
On February 9, 35 COMELEC employees and computer operators at the
COMELEC Tabulation Center walked out in protest due to the wide
discrepancy between the computer tabulation and the tally board, showing
blatant manipulation of electoral results.[92]
In the countryside, precincts were hounded by the military and
ballot-rigging was rampant. NAMFREL, in turn, showed Aquino in the lead
with almost 70 percent of the votes canvassed.
Afraid
of ruling party goons who have been known to snatch ballot boxes to
throw them away or to stuff them with favorable manufactured votes,
vigilantes form human barricades for boxes being brought from precincts
to municipal halls for official tally. Photo by Ben Avestruz, People
Power: The Philippine Revolution of 1986.On
February 9, 1986, thirty-five tabulators manning the COMELEC’s quick
count computer terminals walked out during the 1986 snap elections.
Photo from Bantayog Museum.
By February 15, 1986, in an unprecedented announcement that was met
with public outrage, the Batasang Pambansa proclaimed Marcos and Arturo
Tolentino as the winners of the presidential and vice-presidential race
respectively, by virtue of Resolution No. 38. Opposition assemblymen walked out of the Session Hall in protest.
Twenty-six
parliamentary members walk out from the floor of the National Assembly
just before the assembly proclaimed President Ferdinand Marcos winner of
the February 7 election. The official tally had Marcos the victor over
Corazon Aquino by 1.5 million votes. Photo by Jun Brioso.
This led to the opposition’s indignation rally in Luneta the next day
where Cory Aquino spoke to around two million people in Luneta, in what
would be known as the Tagumpay ng Bayan rally. At the event,
Aquino called for massive civil disobedience and boycott of Marcos-crony
owned companies and products. The Aquino-Laurel ticket also proclaimed
victory.
The International Observer Delegation, composed of 44 delegates from
19 different countries who observed the electoral process, also released
their report citing disturbing anomalies in the election results and
subsequent intimidation of voters.[94]
Supporters
of Cory Aquino and Salvador Laurel holding a ‘Victory of People’ or
‘Tagumpay ng Bayan’ rally, February 16, 1986. Photo from LIFE Photo
Collection.
February 25 was chosen as the day of President Marcos’ inauguration.[95]
As inaugural invitations were sent to the diplomatic corps, none of
embassies sent their congratulatory remarks to Marcos, except for Soviet
ambassador Vadim Shabalin, who was apparently in Malacañan for a
courtesy call. When President Marcos informed him of the supposed result
of the election, the ambassador offered his compliments, which is now
cited as a grave diplomatic error.[96] The silence of foreign governments alarmed the administration.
On February 22, 1986, Marcos sent Labor Minister Blas Ople and
Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor to the United States, and sent
J.V. Cruz and Presidential Assistant for General Government Jacobo Clave
to Europe, in a last ditch effort to legitimize his win in the
presidency. Roberto Benedicto and Arturo Tolentino were to be sent to
Japan, and the ASEAN countries respectively.[97]
Because of the calls for a boycott of crony companies announced by
Cory Aquino, San Miguel Corporation fell in the stock market. The Manila Bulletin also lost a significant number of readers. F. Coup Plot by the RAM
The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) emerged in 1982 as a
small, secret group intent on strengthening military rule through a coup
d’état.[98]
Initially, it was composed of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and a
handful of regular officers from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA),
who harbored resentment against General Fabian Ver, the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
The divide between PMA-trained regulars and officers from the Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) was already evident in the early years
of Martial Law. Marcos appointed ROTC officers to the top positions in
the army, navy, and air force, passing over senior PMA graduates.[99]
When Ver succeeded Romeo Espina as Marcos’ Chief of Staff, Ver was
quick to isolate his rivals. “Ignoring merit or seniority,” writes
Alfred McCoy, “he played upon ethnicity, blood, and school ties to pick
favorites for key commands.”[100]
Himself an alumnus of the University of the Philippines reserve
program, he promoted former reservists and retained them even after
their mandatory retirement, thus stifling the upward mobility of
PMA-trained regulars.[101]
By early 1985, the RAM was a fully organized group with a leadership
committee of 11 men and a membership base of around three hundred.
Although relatively small, the RAM had the support of a majority of AFP
officers, especially the PMA regulars.[102]
By the middle of the year, the RAM went public, yet popular suspicion
regarding the movement’s integrity arose due to its inclusion of former
military torturers.[103] Still, most media outlets ignored their human rights record, choosing instead to paint the RAM as reformers.[104]
Plans for a Christmas coup in 1985 were started in August, but when
President Marcos unexpectedly called for snap elections in November,[105]
RAM leaders had to rethink their strategy, and the coup was postponed
for the following year. When Marcos was proclaimed the winner in the
fraudulent February 7 elections, the RAM leaders agreed to launch their
coup at 2:00 a.m. (“H-hour”) on Sunday, February 23, 1986.[106]
The plan was as follows: At 1:30 a.m., Colonel Gregorio “Gringo”
Honasan and twenty commandos would cross the Pasig River on rubber rafts
and break into the Malacañan Palace, arresting President Marcos and
Imelda. At 2:00 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo “Red” Kapunan would
command a hundred-man strike team to attack the security compound on the
southern bank of the Pasig. Using smoke grenades as cover, they would
detonate bombs and kill General Fabian Ver. The explosions would serve
as a signal for two motorized RAM columns to break through the gates of
the security compound. Major Saulito Aromin’s 49th Infantry Battalion
would launch a simultaneous maneuver, posing as pro-Marcos
reinforcements to reinforce Honasan’s commandos and secure the Palace.
At 2:30 a.m, the Presidential Security Command would transmit false
orders to eight pro-Marcos battalions in the capital to keep them from
moving. At the same time, Colonel Tito Legazpi would capture Villamor
Airbase and radio RAM units in the provinces to fly to Manila. At 3:00
a.m., just an hour after the coup’s launch, Enrile would issue
Proclamation No. 1, establishing a revolutionary government.[107]
Yet for all the RAM leaders’ confidence in their plan, they did not
have the command experience to successfully carry out the complicated
operation, after almost ten years of sitting in air-conditioned offices.[108]
And to make matters worse, Ver knew of the coup. On the Thursday before
the planned coup, he summoned his senior officers and engineered a
trap. He ordered a navy demolition team to plant bombs and mines along
the palace riverfront. As the rebels made their way toward the palace on
rafts, Ver would blind them with powerful spotlights. Marcos’ son,
Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., would be brought out with a loud
hailer, giving the rebels a final chance to surrender. If the rebels did
not stand down, they would be blown sky high.[109]
The rebels only realized that their plan had been compromised on the
Friday night before the coup, when Honasan and Kapunan saw a large
number of troops amassing at Malacañang. They informed Enrile about the
situation, and the assault on the palace had to be called off.[110]
The
map used by General Fabian Ver to plan out the attack on Camp Crame and
Camp Aguinaldo, superimposed onto a current aerial photograph of the
area. This map was drawn on a blackboard and remains on display in the
Presidential Museum and Library.
Faced with only two options—dispersing or regrouping—Enrile chose the latter as the “more honorable” option.[111]
He announced his defection from Marcos on Saturday night in a press
conference at Camp Aguinaldo, alongside Lieutenant General Fidel V.
Ramos, Ver’s deemed successor.[112]
In the first critical hours of the uprising, RAM leaders called on
former PMA classmates and comrades, pleading for support or at the very
least neutrality, thus undermining Marcos’ defenses.[113]
At 9:00 p.m., Jaime Cardinal Sin made his famous announcement over
Radio Veritas, beseeching the people to bring food and gather at Camps
Aguinaldo and Crame to support Enrile and Ramos. An hour later, Enrile
finally reached Cory Aquino via telephone.[114] Aquino was at an anti-Marcos rally in Cebu City. She was informed of the coup[115],
but she was also suspicious of Enrile’s motives. Half a day later, she
announced her support for the rebellion and asked the people to help.[116]
On that first night, people came to EDSA by the thousands with
whatever provisions they could offer: pans of pancit, boxes of pizza,
tins of biscuits, bunches of bananas.[117]
Edwin Lacierda, presidential spokesperson of President Benigno S.
Aquino III, was there to witness: “More than a rally,” he recalls, “all
of us came to EDSA to break bread and fellowship with all who were
willing to stand in the line of fire and take the bullet, as it were,
for freedom and change of government.”[118]
Thus began the four-day EDSA People Power Revolution.
The revolution was a peaceful one, with soldiers being coaxed with
food, prayers, flowers, and cheers by people from all walks of life who
sat, stood, and knelt in prayer in front of the tanks.[119]
For instance, on February 24, the government-controlled Channel 4 was
liberated by women who were sent into the compound to negotiate with the
loyalist soldiers.[120] Church-owned radio station Radio Veritas did a marathon coverage of the revolution; disc jockey June Keithley, who averaged seventeen hours on air daily over the four days, kept the public informed in between airings of Ang Bayan Ko, Tie a Yellow Ribbon, and a curiously resurrected political jingle from the 1950s called Mambo Magsaysay.[121]
In the evening of February 22, Marcos personally telephoned General
Prospero Olivas five times, ordering him to disperse the crowd at Camp
Aguinaldo, because their presence would complicate an assault. A mentee
of Ramos, Olivas feigned compliance and countermanded Marcos’ orders.
Marcos then turned to General Alfredo Lim, the Metrocom district
commander, but Lim was also loyal to Ramos and disregarded Marcos’
orders.[122]
In addition to the reluctance of Marcos’ officers, Marine Commandant
Artemio Tadiar also pointed out the military incompetence of Ver’s plan,
saying, “Every inch of the palace was occupied, literally.” “There were
[…] over eight thousand men packed so tightly in the narrow streets
around the palace that they had no room to maneuver, and reinforcements
were still arriving.”[123]
On February 24, at 5:00 a.m., Marcos was heard over the radio, “We’ll
wipe them out. It is obvious they are committing rebellion.”[124]
On that Monday morning, government troops headed by Marine battalions
began their advance to Camp Crame from different directions as a dozen
of helicopters encircled the camp. At 6:20 a.m., the tensed crowd around
the Constabulary Headquarters waited with uncertainty as the
helicopters approached.[125] Wurfel narrates one of the pivotal events of People Power as fear turned into loud cheers from the crowd:
When eight helicopters circled over Camp Crame on Monday
morning, fears of bombardment were still high, but they landed and
joined the rebels. This was probably the military turning point;
thereafter military defections took place at an increasing pace. Yet Ver
threatened to bomb and strafe Camp Crame, and Marcos held a press
conference where he insisted, “I don’t intend to step down as President.
Never, never!”
At 8:30 a.m., government troops broke into the rear of Camp Aguinaldo
and trained their howitzers and mortars on Camp Crame. By 9:00 a.m.,
General Josephus Ramas gave the Fourth Marine brigade the “kill order”
while civilians were still inside, but the brigade’s commander Colonel
Braulio Balbas hesitated. Instead, he told Ramas, “We’re still
positioning the cannons.”[126] Ramas would ask Balbas to attack four times, and each time, Balbas stalled. Marcos lost control of the Marines.[127]
At around the same time, a rebel frigate anchored at the mouth of the
Pasig River had its guns aimed at Malacañan, just three kilometers
away. Earlier that morning, Naval Defense Force chief Commodore Tagumpay
Jardiniano told his men that he had declared himself for Enrile and
Ramos. His men stood up and applauded, and Marcos lost control of the
navy.[128]
At 9:15 a.m., Marcos, together with Ver appeared on television for a
Press Conference. Ver requested Marcos permission to attack Camp Crame.
But Marcos postured on TV to restrain Ver, saying, “My order is to disperse without shooting them.”[129]
However, when Marine commandant General Artemio Tadiar met with Ver
later, Ver confirmed that Marcos approved the kill order on Crame.[130]
Following a rocket attack from the rebel helicopters, General Ver
radioed the wing commander of the F-5 fighters in Manila, ordering them
to bomb Camp Crame. Francisco Baula, the squadron leader and RAM member,
answered sarcastically: “Yes, sir, roger. Proceeding now to strafe
Malacañang.”[131]
At 1:00 p.m., General Ver gave secret orders to Major General Vicente
Piccio to launch an air attack on Camp Crame, to which General Piccio
replied, “But, sir, we have no more gunships. They have just been
destroyed.”[132] Marcos lost control of the air force.
After Marcos lost complete control of the military, his presidency came to an end the following day, on February 25, 1986.
Defense
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile (right) is joined by Lieutenant General
Fidel V. Ramos as he announces his defection from the Marcos
administration. Photo taken from Bayan Ko!III. Conclusion
From February 22 to 25, 1986, hundreds of thousands of people amassed
at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), Metro Manila’s main
thoroughfare, calling for the peaceful ouster of the dictator. On
February 25, 1986, Corazon C. Aquino
and Salvador H. Laurel took their oaths in Club Filipino as President
and Vice President respectively. Meanwhile, Marcos was inaugurated in
the Ceremonial Hall of the Malacañan Palace and delivered his inaugural
address in Maharlika Hall (now Kalayaan Hall)
on that same day. Rocked by key military and political defections and
the overwhelming popular support for Aquino, Marcos was forced to depart
with his family a few hours later for exile in Hawaii, effectively ending Marcos’ two-decade long dictatorial rule.
By March 1986,[133]
intelligence sources surfaced indicating that President Marcos was
planning to stage widespread bombing and arson operations throughout
Manila, so he could impose another martial law—called “Operation
Everlasting.” The plan was to neutralize all opposition by arresting all
opposition leaders, the entire executive council of NAMFREL[134] and the RAM rebels in a planned concentration camp in Caballo Island near Corregidor.[135]
Hence, the EDSA People Power Revolution averted a resumption of an
oppressive regime that would have curtailed the country’s civil
liberties in the years to come.
The
Philippines had its “longest day” on February 25, 1986, as it started
the day with virtually no president, had two presidents by noon, and one
president before midnight. TOP, oath taking as President by Corazon C.
Aquino at Club Filipino before Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee.
BOTTOM, President Ferdinand E. Marcos sworn in Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino in the Ceremonial Hall, Malacañan Palace.Bibliography
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Wurfel, David. Filipino Politics: Development and Decay. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988. Endnotes [1] “Editorial:Constitutional Convention or Malacañang Kennel?” Philippine Free Press, January 22, 1972, accessed February 18, 2016, link. [2] Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office (PCDSPO), Philippine Electoral Almanac, rev. and exp. edition (Manila: PCDSPO, 2015), 115. [3] David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay, (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press), 116. [4] Ibid. [5] PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 116-120. [6] Rigoberto Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” in Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power, eds. Aurora Javate-De Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (Manila: Conspectus Foundation Inc., 1988), 26. [7] Rosalinda Pineda Ofreneo, The Manipulated Press: A History of Philippine Journalism Since 1945 (Mandaluyong City: Cacho Hermanos Inc., 1984), 135. [8] D. H. Soriano, Amadeo R. Dacanay, Paulina F. Bautista, and R. R. Marcelino, The Roces Family, Publishers: With a History of the Philippine Press (Quezon City: Islas Filipinas Publishing, 1987), 125; Dominador D. Buhain, A History of Publishing in the Philippines (Quezon City: Rex Book Store, 1998), 98. [9] Gerald Sussman, “Politics and the Press: The Philippines Since Marcos,” Philippine Studies 36, no. 4 (1988): 495. [10] Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” 30. [11] Ibid. 29. [12] David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988), 204. [13] Ibid., 205. [14] Ibid. [15] Ibid., 208-209. [16] Ibid., 206. [17] Manuel F. Martinez, Aquino Vs. Marcos: The Grand Collision (Quezon City: Manuel F. Martinez, 1987), 342. [18] Ibid., 340-341. [19]
Emmanuel S. de Dios, “The Erosion of the Dictatorship,” in Aurora
Javate-de Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, eds., Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, 1988), 70. [20] Ibid. [21] PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 122. [22] Ibid., 125. [23] Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, 2005), 217. [24] Ibid., 219; Benigno Aquino Jr., “Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil,” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. March 28, 1968, accessed November 27, 2015, http://www.gov.ph/1968/03/28/jabidah-special-forces-of-evil-by-senator-benigno-s-aquino-jr/; Proclamation No. 1081 s. 1972 (September 21, 1972); “Third Republic,” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, accessed November 27, 2015, http://www.gov.ph/featured/third-republic/. [25] Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 217. [26] Ibid., 217 and 219. [27] Ibid., 219. [28] Manuel Quezon III, “Road to EDSA”, Today Newspaper, February 25, 1996, February 22, 2016, http://mlq3.tumblr.com/post/3415013093/the-road-to-edsa. [29] Gregg Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 225-226. [30] Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 220. [31] De Dios, “The Erosion of the Dictatorship,” 128. [32] Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 220. [33] Ibid. [34] Ibid. [35] Manuel L. Quezon III, “The Road to EDSA,” Today, February 25, 1996, accessed February 18, 2016, link. [36] Katherine Ellison, Imelda: Steel Butterfly of the Philippines, (Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse, Inc., 1988), 206. [37] “One can never justify any violation of rights’: John Paul II stands up to a dictator,” GMA News Online, April 27, 2014, accessed February 16, 2016, link. [38] Alfred W. McCoy, Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 226. [39] Editorial, “If,” Philippine Free Press, August 23, 1986, link. [40] “Aide confirms illness of Marcos,” The New York Times, December 4, 1984, accessed February 10, 2016, link. [41] “Marcos reported stricken by fatal illness,” Chicago Tribune, October 18, 1985, accessed February 10, 2016, link. [42] “Marcos seriously ill with rare disease lupus, U.S. sources say,” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1986, accessed February 10, 2016, link. [43] Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 235. [44] PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 123. [45] Muego, “The Executive Committee in the Philippines,” 1159. [46] Ibid. [47] Ibid., 1167. [48] PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 128-129. [49] Carolina G. Hernandez, “Reconstituting Political Order,” in Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond, ed. John Bresnan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 182. [50] PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 130. [51] James K. Boyce, The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1993), 347. [52]
The Green Revolution was a strategy of introducing new rice
technologies to Philippine agriculture, utilizing scientific research of
international agencies and applying it to Philippine crops such as
rice. [53] Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 90-91. [54] John M. Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 232. [55] Ibid., 233. [56] Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 169-170. [57] Ibid., 210. [58] Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, 232. [59] Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 210. [60] Ibid., 211. [61] Ibid., 180. [62] Jeffrey Riedinger, Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Democratic Transitions and Redistributive Reform, (California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 130. [63] Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 212. [64] Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, 232. [65] Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 205. [66] Ibid,, 205. [67] Ibid., 348. [68] Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy (New York, NY: Times Books, 1987), 264. [69] Ibid., 265. [70] Ibid., 267. [71] Ibid. [72] Ibid., 265. [73] Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 238. [74] Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 219; Aquino, “Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil,” http://www.gov.ph/1968/03/28/jabidah-special-forces-of-evil-by-senator-benigno-s-aquino-jr/; Proclamation No. 1081 s. 1972; “Third Republic,” http://www.gov.ph/featured/third-republic/. [75] Rigoberto Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” in Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power, eds. Aurora Javate-De Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (Manila: Conspectus Foundation Inc., 1988), 66. [76] Teodoro M. Locsin, “The Conscience of the Filipino: The Sacrifice,” Philippine Free Press Online, August 20, 1986, accessed February 16, 2016, link. [77] Ibid. [78] Gemma Nemenzo Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” in Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power, eds. Aurora Javate-de Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, 1988), 176. [79] Ibid., 180. [80] Gemma Nemenzo Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” 180. [81] Ibid., 177. [82] Ibid., 185. [83] Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 296. [84] David G. Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 131. [85] “Salvador Laurel Diary,” Philippine Diary Project, June 12, 1895, link. [86] Wurfel, 183. [87] PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 132. [88] Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” 200. [89] Ibid., 201. [90] Ibid. [91]
Table: Composition and Distribution of U.S. Observer Delegations for
the February 7, 1986 Presidential Elections, January 15 to February 15,
1986, from the reconstructed files of COMELEC, Office of the
President/National Media Production Center-International Center, and
Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, D.C.. [92] COMELEC Employees’ Union, “COMELEC UNION: 1986 poll employees’ walkout provided spark for EDSA People Power Revolt,” InterAksyon.com, February 24, 2013, accessed February 11, 2016, link. [93] Reynaldo Santos, “1986 COMELEC Walkout Not about Cory or Marcos,” Rappler, February 25, 2013, accessed February 15, 2016, link. [94] International Observer Delegation, A Path to Democratic Renewal: A Report on the February 7, 1986 Presidential Election in the Philippines, accessed February 17, 2016, link. [95] Nick Joaquin (Quijano de Manila), The Quarter of the Tiger Moon: Scenes from the People Power Apocalypse (Manila: Book Stop, 1986), 11. [96] Leszek Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), link. [97] Joaquin, TheQuartet of the Tiger Moon, 13. [98] McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 231. [99] Ibid., 225. [100] Ibid., 227. [101] Ibid., 229-230. [102] Ibid., 232. [103] Ibid., 237 [104] Ibid., 233. [105] Ibid., 233-234. [106] Ibid., 241. [107] Ibid., 237-238. [108] Ibid., 238. [109] Ibid., 241. [110] Ibid., 243. [111] Joaquin, The Quarter of the Tiger Moon, 19. [112] McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 244. [113] Ibid., 245. [114] Angela Stuart-Santiago, “Chronology of a Revolution,” accessed on February 18, 2016, link. [115] Cory Aquino was informed by Bel Cunanan, ibid. [116] McCoy, Closer than Brothers 246. [117] Joaquin, The Quartet of the Tiger Moon, 19. [118] Edwin Lacierda, “Where were you?” Rappler, February 25, 2015, accessed February 17, 2016, link. [119] Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 305. [120] Joaquin, The Quartet of the Tiger Moon, 62. [121] Ibid., 44. [122] McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 244. [123] Ibid., 248. [124] Angela Stuart-Santiago “Chronology of a Revolution,” accessed on February 18, 2016, link. [125] Ibid. [126] McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251. [127] Ibid. [128] McCoy, 250. [129] Santiago, “Chronology of the Revolution,” link. [130] Ibid., McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251. [131] McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251-252. [132] Santiago, “Chronology of the Revolution,” link. [133] Associated Press News Archive,
“Military reveals arson, bombing plot during Marcos’ last days with
Am-Philippines”, March 6, 1986, accessed on February 22, 2016, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1986/Military-Reveals-Arson-Bombing-Plot-during-Marcos-Last-Days-With-AM-Philippines/id-6f34fa5e77ac9e74672552beed788564 [134] Beth Day Romulo, Inside the Palace: The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, (Feffer & Sons, 1987), p. 223-225. [135]Bryan Johnson, Four Days of Courage: The Untold Story of the Fall of Marcos, (Canada: McClellan and Stewart, 1987), 267
